Recently, optimistic fair exchange in electronic commerce (e-commerce) or mobile commerce (m-commerce) has made great progress. However, new technologies create large amounts of data and it is di cult to handle them. Fortunately, with the assistance of cloud computing and big data, optimistic fair exchange of digital items in cyber-physical systems (CPSes) can be e ciently managed. Optimistic fair exchange in cloud-assisted CPSes mainly focuses on online data exchange in e-commerce or online contracts signing. However, there exist new forms of risks in the uncertain network environment. To solve the above problems, we use a new technique called veri ably encrypted identity-based signature (VEIS) to construct optimistic fair exchange in cloud-assisted CPSes. VEIS is an encrypted signature, and we can check the validity of the underlying signature without decrypting it. We introduce a robust arbitration mechanism to guarantee fairness of the exchange, and even the trusted third party (TTP) cannot get the original signatures of the exchange parties. And the TTP in our protocol is o ine, which greatly improves the e ciency. Besides, we show that our protocol is secure, fair, and practical.
Introduction
1.1. Background. In recent years, optimistic fair exchange in e-commerce and m-commerce has grown fast and information technology has been widely utilized. However, with the development of the information systems, the data are rapidly and continuously created from varieties of devices in the transaction, leaving big challenges for data storage and management. e new cloud-assisted cyberphysical systems (CPSes), which combine the big data, cloud computing, internet of things, and even arti cial intelligence with industrial automation, can be used to deal with huge les and complex structures in the fair exchange. e model of optimistic fair exchange in cloud-assisted CPSes is shown in Figure 1 . In such systems, users can purchase the service or store their data in the cloud data service. Besides, they can also use their data to trade with others or sign contracts on digital les. For example, if Alice attempts to exchange her digital content with Bob in another cloud, she needs to perform optimistic fair exchange of signatures in her physical devices (e.g., desktop, laptop, or smartphone).
Although optimistic fair exchange in cloud-assisted CPSes plays a signi cant role in e-commerce or m-commerce with new capabilities, there still exist risks. Security and privacy issues continue to be a barrier for optimistic fair exchange due to the uncertain network environment. For uncertain environment of fair exchange, we consider two aspects: uncertain contents of the exchange and uncertain activities of the exchange [1, 2] . On the one hand, the exchange parties may not know what will be received before the exchange. On the other hand, no one can make sure the other party does honestly in the transaction. To solve the above problems, we proposed optimistic fair exchange, which is secure and practical in cloud-assisted CPSes.
two exchange parties and a trusted third party (TTP, also called arbiter). Suppose Alice and Bob are parties involved in the protocol, and they need to exchange their signatures of contracts. In the protocol, Alice first sends a partial signature to Bob, and Bob then checks the validity of the partial signature. If it is invalid, Bob stops the protocol. Otherwise, Bob sends his full signature to Alice. Alice then checks whether Bob's full signature is valid. If it is valid, then Alice sends her full signature to Bob. If Bob does not receive Alice's full signature or receives an invalid signature, then Bob submits his full signature and Alice's partial signature to the TTP, the TTP first checks whether Bob's signature is valid. If it is valid, then the TTP converts the partial signature to the full signature and returns it to Bob. At the same time, the TTP returns Bob's full signature to Alice as well. Otherwise, the TTP does nothing.
ere are other fair exchange protocols which use different technologies. In [5] , the authors proposed a fair document exchange, which protected the anonymity of signers. eir another work [6] offered the protection of the private information and provided offline signature recovery. Fan et al. [7] used watermarking technology to construct fair content exchange in cloud computing; however, they did not give the full security proof. In [8] , they showed optimistic fair exchange protocols which can be used in file sharing system with a high volume of data exchanged. However, all the above schemes have weaknesses. We compare these schemes with ours in the following aspects. e results are shown in Table 1 .
(i) Identity-based cryptosystem: it does not need to exchange public and private keys and does not need key directories; thus, it has better efficiency than PKI-based cryptosystem. (ii) Semitrusted third party (TTP): since malicious TTP may leak the information of the users, we need to use semi-TTP to replace fully trusted arbiter.
(iii) Strong security: security is important for optimistic fair exchange; however, we find some schemes do not satisfy strong security since they do not give the attack model and security proof.
A kind of technique called verifiably encrypted signature (VES) can be used to construct optimistic fair exchange in cloud-assisted CPSes. VES is an encrypted signature, and we can check the validity without extracting the original signature. Some optimistic fair exchange protocols based on VES [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] have been proposed. However, most of them are based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), thus leading to the high cost in authenticating and managing the public keys. Fortunately, several identity-based VES schemes [9, 10, 12] have been proposed since identity-based cryptosystems can be used to reduce the cost in public key distribution and management. Most identity-based schemes are more efficient. With regard to security, most schemes consider only if an adversary cannot forge a valid original signature and a valid VES. However, they do not consider stronger security attributes: Can anyone forge a valid VES while the underlying signature is invalid? Meanwhile, many schemes do not give the attack model and security proof. erefore, even though the schemes [9, 10, 12] are highly efficient, they are not very secure. We compare our scheme with the above schemes in four aspects in Table 2 :
(i) Identity-based cryptosystem: it greatly reduces the cost in management of the public keys because it does not need to exchange public and private keys and does not need key directories. (ii) Standard model: the security proof of a scheme does not use random oracle model. (iii) Strong security: it means that the scheme satisfies three different security properties at the same time. e properties include opacity, unforgeability, and extractability. Meanwhile, there should be the attack model and security proof. (iv) High efficiency: the lower the computational overhead involved in a scheme, the higher the efficiency. erefore, high efficiency means less use of complex mathematical operations, including exponential, hash, and bilinear operations, while maintaining strong security properties. For a detailed computational overhead, refer to Table 3 . 
Identitybased cryptosystem
Semitrusted third party
Strong security
Zhang et al. [5] No No No Zhang et al. [6] No Yes Yes Fan et al. [7] No No No Kp and Lysyanskaya [8] No No Yes Gu et al. [9] Yes No No Zhang et al. [10] Yes No  No  Ours  Yes  Yes  Yes   2 Security and Communication Networks Motivated by the above works, we construct an optimistic fair exchange protocol with a new kind of VES scheme which combines an identity-based signature scheme and a PKI-based encryption scheme. In this way, we can achieve secure and efficient fair exchange in cloud-assisted CPSes.
Our Contributions.
Technically, we use a new cryptographic technique called verifiably identity-based signature (VEIS) to construct the optimistic fair exchange protocol. e VEIS scheme which combines an identity-based signature scheme [16] and the ElGamal encryption scheme [17] allows us to exchange signatures in the cloud-assisted CPSes easily. Besides, we define the security properties according to the major requirements of optimistic fair exchange in cloudassisted CPSes. e properties include opacity, unforgeability, and extractability. Opacity guarantees that no one can extract a valid signature from a VEIS without the private key. Unforgeability means that no one can forge a VEIS without the signing key of his identity. And extractability means that if a VEIS is valid, then a valid signature can be pulled out from it. en, we construct optimistic fair exchange in cloudassisted CPSes with our VEIS scheme. In our protocol, two parties (Alice and Bob) may exchange their digital signatures in cloud with their physical devices. en, Alice first generates her VEIS and sends it to Bob. Next, Bob sends his identity-based signature to Alice if Alice's VEIS is valid. Finally, Alice sends her identity-based signature to Bob. If cheating occurs during the exchange, the trusted third party (TTP) will get involved and ensure the fairness. Our protocol protects the privacy of the exchange parties since TTP will not get the original signatures of them. Besides, TTP only involves in the exchange when cheating occurs and it reduces the communication cost. e arbitration mechanism guarantees the fairness of the exchange, which means both parties obtain the other's signature or neither does when the protocol ends. Finally, we report the results of the simulation, which show that our protocol is efficient.
Outline.
We organize the rest of this paper as follows. In Section 2, we give some relevant notions and show the building blocks of our scheme. In Section 3, we present the verifiably encrypted identity-based signature (VEIS) scheme which is used to construct our optimistic fair exchange in cloud-assisted CPSes. In Section 4, we construct the optimistic fair exchange protocol with offline TTP. en, we discuss the security and fairness of our protocol. In Section 5, we show the results of the simulation. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
The Main Text

Bilinear Maps and Complexity Assumption.
We first briefly review the bilinear maps and complexity assumptions below.
Bilinear Maps.
Let G and G T be groups of prime order p and g be a generator of G, then we say that e : G × G ⟶ G T is an efficient and computable bilinear map if it satisfies the following properties, i.e., (1) Bilinear: ∀a, b ∈ Z p , we have e(g a , g b ) � e(g, g) ab .
(2) Nondegenerate: e(g, g) ≠ 1: clearly, the bilinearity implies that ∀g 1 , g 2 , g 3 ∈ G, we have e(g 1 , g 3 )e(g 2 , g 3 ) � e(g 1 g 2 , g 3 ).
Complexity
Assumptions. CDH problem: given g, g a , and g b , compute g ab .
If the probability that adversary B solves the CDH problem is at least ϵ, we have Pr B g, g a , g b � g ab ≥ ε.
(1)
en, CDH assumption is as follows.
Definition 1. e (t, ε)-CDH assumption holds if no adversary runs at most t times and has at least ϵ advantage in solving the CDH problem on G.
e aggregate extraction problem: given g, g a , g b , g β , g δ , and g ab+βδ , compute g ab . [11] No Yes No Yes Gu [9] Yes No No Yes Zhang et al. [10] Yes Yes No No Lu et al. [12] Yes Yes No Yes Nishimaki and Xagawa [13] No Yes Yes No Shao and Gao [14] No No Yes No Seo et al. [15] No Yes Yes No Ours Yes Yes Yes Yes If the probability that adversary B solves the aggregate extraction problem is at least ϵ, we have Pr B g, g a , g b , g β , g δ , g ab+βδ � g ab ≥ ε.
(2) en, aggregate extraction assumption is as follows.
Definition 2. e (t, ϵ)-aggregate extraction assumption holds if no adversary runs at most t times and has at least ϵ advantage in solving the aggregate extraction problem on G.
Building Blocks.
Our optimistic fair exchange protocol is mainly based on Paterson's identity-based signature (IBS) scheme [16] and ElGamal encryption scheme [17] , which are described as follows.
Paterson's IBS Scheme.
Let G and G T be groups of prime order p and g be a generator of G. ere exists an efficient and computable bilinear map e : G × G ⟶ G T . All identities and messages will be assumed to be bit strings of length n u and n m , respectively. We can also let identities be bit strings of arbitrary length and n u and n m be the output length of collision-resistant hash functions, H u :
e signature scheme is defined by the following algorithms.
Setup: a secret α ∈ Z p and generator g of G are chosen at random. en, set the value g 1 � g α and choose g 2 randomly in G. Additionally, pick elements u ′ , m ′ ∈ G randomly and vectors U � (u i ), M � (m i ) of length n u and n m , where u i and m i are randomly chosen from G. e public parameters are MPK � (G, G T , e, g, g 1 , g 2 , u ′ , U, m ′ , M) and the master secret key is MSK � g α 2 . Extract: let U be a bit string of length n u representing an identity and let U[i] be the ith bit of U. Define U ⊂ 1, . . . , n u to be the set of indices i such that U[i] � 1. A private key for identity U is generated as follows. First, choose a random r u ∈ Z p . en, compute
Sign: let m be a bit string of length n m representing a message. Furthermore, let M ⊂ 1, . . . , n m be a set of indices j such that m[j] � 1. A signature of U on m is constructed as follows: First, pick a random r m ∈ Z p . en, compute
Verify: suppose we wish to check if σ � (σ 0 , σ 1 , σ 2 ) is a valid signature of an identity U on m. e signature is accepted if it holds that
e Modified Signature Scheme. In Paterson's IBS scheme, we find one element of the signature (σ 1 ) is a part of the private key (d 2 ) and it is not allowed in the strictest sense.
us, we randomize the first two elements, including the secret key part of the original signature. Let Σ � (Setup, Extract, Sign, Verify) be Paterson's IBS scheme, and the new IBS scheme Σ ′ � (Setup ′ , Extract ′ , Sign ′ , Verify ′ ) is as follows:
Setup ′ and Extract ′ are the same as Setup and Extract, respectively. Sign ′ : choose random r u ′ , r m ∈ Z p and compute
Verify ′ : we can check the validity of the signature by the following equation:
If the equation holds, then the signature is valid. Otherwise, it is invalid. e modified signature scheme is existentially unforgeable and the security proof is almost the same as stated in [16] , we will not prove it again. We use the following theorem to show that.
Theorem 1.
e modified identity-based signature scheme is existentially unforgeable if the CDH assumption holds.
e Encryption Scheme. In the ElGamal encryption scheme, KeyGen generates a pair of keys
where g is a generator of G. Enc takes as input PK, a message m, and outputs ciphertext C � (
where t is randomly chosen from G. Dec takes as input C, the secret key SK, and outputs the message m � C 1 /C α 2 � m.
Verifiably Encrypted Identity-Based Signature
Verifiable encrypted identity-based signature (VEIS) is an encrypted identity-based signature, allowing its validity to be checked without decryption. We encrypt the identity-based signature with the public key encryption scheme. In fact, our scheme is a weak version of the identity-based verifiably encrypted signature scheme as stated in [18] ; thus, we call it verifiably encrypted identity-based signature (VEIS). Informally, the VEIS system works as follows. A private key generator (PKG) generates private keys for the signers, and a key generator (KG) generates keys pairs for the adjudicator.
A signer generates a signature on a message with a signing key associated with his identity, then encrypts it with the adjudicator's public key, and obtains a VEIS. A verifier can publicly check whether the VEIS is valid. e adjudicator can decrypt VEIS with his private key and get the original signature. We now present our definition of VEIS, as well as several properties. 
Adj: the adjudicator takes as input ω and SK T , decrypts VEIS, and then obtains a signature σ ⟵ Adj(ω, SK T ). Ver: a verifier can check whether the signature is valid.
Security Definitions.
In [11] , Boneh et al. proposed two security definitions of verifiably encrypted signature (VES), i.e., unforgeability and opacity. Unforgeability means that no one can forge a VES without the signing key. Opacity guarantees that no one can extract a valid signature from a VES without the adjudicator's private key. In fact, we find that the VES scheme in [11] missed an important property, i.e., extractability. Extractability means that a valid signature can be extracted from a VES if it passes the check. And we require that extractability must hold even when the master public key and encrypted signatures are maliciously generated.
We now formalize three security definitions of VEIS, i.e., unforgeability, opacity, and extractability. ey are all defined in games which are played by a challenger and an adversary. Besides, we define the following oracles:
(i) Signing key oracle: the adversary can make a query for a private key associated with an identity U of a signer, the challenger first gets the master key, runs SKG, and then responds with the private key sk U . (ii) VEIS oracle: the adversary can make a query for a VEIS on message m of an identity U; the challenger first gets a private key of U, runs VESign, and responds with a VEIS ω. (iii) Adjudication oracle: the adversary can make a query for a signature by providing a message m, a VEIS ω, and an identity U. e challenger first gets the decryption key, runs Adj, and responds with a signature σ. en, the security definitions are as follows. 
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Oracle. If σ * is a valid signature on m * of identity U * , A wins in the above game.
A VEIS scheme is opaque if for any PPT adversary A, the probability that A wins in the above game is negligible.
Definition 5. Extractability is defined by the game Game Extr (λ), which involves a challenger and an adversary A. A VEIS scheme is extractable if for all PPT adversaries A, the probability that adversaries wins in the above game is negligible.
We require that if a VEIS scheme satisfies the unforgeability, opacity, and extractability, then it is secure.
e Proposed VEIS Scheme.
We now present the concrete VEIS scheme. A VEIS scheme consists of following algorithms.
Setup: it takes as input a security parameter 1 λ and generates the system parameters. Let G and G T be groups of prime order p, g be a generator of G, and e be a bilinear map; that is, e : G × G ⟶ G T . An identity for a signer is denoted by U. We assume that the length of the identity is n u . If it is not, then we use a hash function H u : 0, 1 { } ⟶ 0, 1 { } n u to obtain n u -length identity. en, choose n u -length vectors U � (u i ) and n m -length vector M � (m j ) at random, where u i , m j ∈ G. Besides, pick random u ′ , m ′ ∈ G. Choose random α 1 ∈ Z p as the secret value. Compute g 1 � g α 1 . Choose g 2 ∈ G randomly. en, set the master secret key MSK � g α 1 2 and the master public key MPK � (G, G T , e, g, g 1 , g 2 , u ′ , U, m ′ , M). Besides, choose random α T ∈ Z p and then set the private key for adjudication as SK T � α T , and the public key is PK T � g α T . SKG: it takes as input an identity of a signer, U, and the master secret key MSK and outputs a private key for signing as follows. First, let U ⊂ 1, . . . , n u be the set of indices i such that U[i] � 1, where U[i] is the ith bit of U. en, choose a random r u ∈ Z p and compute
VESign: it takes as input a signing key d U and a message m and generates a signature as follows. Let M ⊂ 1, . . . , n m be the set of indices j such that m[j] � 1, where m[j] is the jth bit of m. en, choose a random r u ′ , r m ∈ Z p and construct a signature by computing
en, we construct a VEIS as follows. In fact, since σ 1 and σ 2 are independent with the message and identity U 1 , we only need to encrypt σ 0 . Choose a random t ∈ Z p and construct the VEIS by computing
VEVer: if the following equation holds:
e ω 1 , g � e PK T , ω 2 e g 2 , g 1 e
then, the VEIS is valid and the verifier outputs 1. Otherwise, he outputs 0. Adj: it takes as input ω and SK T � α T and outputs a signature by computing
6 Security and Communication Networks Ver: it checks whether σ � (σ 0 , σ 1 , σ 2 ) is valid. If the equation
holds, then the signature is valid and Ver outputs 1. Otherwise, Ver outputs 0 to show σ is invalid.
Our scheme is secure in the standard model, and the security proof will be shown in the next section.
Optimistic Fair Exchange in Cloud-Assisted CPSes
In this section, we construct optimistic fair exchange in cloud-assisted CPSes based on the proposed VEIS scheme. e system model is shown in Figure 2 . Two parties (known as Alice and Bob) may want to exchange their signatures on digital goods in cloud. ey first get their private keys from a private key generator. en, they perform our optimistic fair exchange protocol and get the signature of each other fairly. If there exist disputes, they can ask the TTP for arbitration.
Optimistic Fair Exchange Protocol.
It is more straightforward to design the fair exchange protocol with online TTP than optimistic fair exchange (fair exchange protocol with offline TTP). However, optimistic fair exchange is more efficient since it greatly reduces the workload on the TTP. In the optimistic fair exchange protocol, the TTP only involves in the exchange when someone attempts to cheat. And TTP in our protocol will not get the original signature of the parties in the exchange. Without loss of generality, we assume Alice and Bob have agreed on two files m A and m B , and Alice is the protocol initiator. e concrete protocol is as follows:
(i) Initialization: take as input security parameter 1 λ , run Setup(1 λ ), and output master public key MPK � (G, G T , e, g, g 1 , g 2 , u ′ , U, m ′ , M) and the master secret key MSK � g α 1 2 . Besides, the TTP chooses random α T ∈ Z p , and then he sets a key pair for adjudication as (SK T , PK T ) � (α T , g α T ). Similarly, A and B choose random α A , α B ∈ Z p , and then set their key pairs as (SK A , PK A ) � (α A , g α A ) and (SK B , PK B ) � (α B , g α B ), respectively. (ii) Registration: a user can register with his identity u and obtain a signing key. Let u be a bit string of length n u and let u[i] be the ith bit of u. Define U ⊂ 1, . . . , n u to be the set of indices i such that u[i] � 1. e signing key for identity u is computed as follows:
(iii) Exchange: let u A and u B be identities of A and B, respectively. en Alice and Bob will obtain their signing keys d u A � (d A,1 , d A,2 ) and d u B � (d B,1 ,  d B ,2 ), respectively. e time t 1 denotes the maximum time Alice can wait, and the time t 2 denotes the longest the Bob can wait. en, the optimistic fair exchange of identity-based signatures is as follows:
(1) Alice first generates her identity-based signature (on m A ) as
en, she encrypts it with the new public key PK � PK T · PK B � g α T +α B and obtains 3 , ω A,4 . (2) Bob quits if he waited more than t 2 . Otherwise, after receiving ω A ‖ m B from Alice, Bob checks whether the following equation holds:
e ω A,1 , g � ? e PK, ω A,2 e g 2 , g 1 e
If the equation holds, then ω A is valid and it implies that the identity-based signature σ A is valid as well. Bob generates his identity-based signature (on m B ), encrypts it with the new public key PK � PK T · PK A � g α T +α A , and obtains 1 , ω B,2 , ω B,3 , 
(23)
Security.
In fact, the security of our protocol can be reduced to the security of the VEIS scheme as stated in [9] . erefore, we mainly consider the following questions. Can anyone forge a valid original signature? Can anyone forge a valid VEIS? Given a VEIS, can anyone extract a valid signature from it? And there is an extra question which is missed in [9, 10] : Can anyone forge a valid VEIS while the underlying signature is invalid? e above questions are the basis of the security properties. erefore, we will show that our scheme satisfies unforgeability, opacity, and extractability by the following theorems.
Theorem 2. Our VEIS scheme is unforgeable.
Proof. In fact, if A forges a valid VEIS ω * (on m * ) of identity U * , he breaks the unforgeability of our VEIS scheme, and we can construct an adversary B that breaks the existential unforgeability of the underlying signature scheme. erefore, the unforgeability of our VEIS scheme can be reduced to the underlying IBS scheme, which is slightly different from Paterson's IBS scheme. We now prove eorem 2 by the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1.
Our VEIS scheme is unforgeable if the underlying signature scheme is existentially unforgeable.
Proof. If there exists an adversary A that forges a tuple (m * , ω * , U * ) with a nonnegligible probability ϵ and it holds that VEVer(m * , ω * , MPK, PK T , U * ) � 1, then A breaks the unforgeability of the VEIS scheme. And we can construct an adversary B that breaks the existential unforgeability of the underlying signature scheme. We assume that A and B play the game Game Forge (λ), and B simulates the challenger and tries to break the underlying signature scheme. We now show how to construct B.
Setup: B runs algorithm Setup and gets the master secret key MSK � g α 1 2 , the master public key MPK � (G, G T , e, g, g 1 , g 2 , u ′ , U, m ′ , M) , the adjudicator's public key PK T � g α T , and adjudicator's private key SK T � α T . en he sends MPK and PK T to A, which are indistinguishable from the real ones. Query: B simulates oracles as follows:
(a) Simulation of signing key oracle: when A submits an identity U of a signer and requests a private key, B chooses r u at random and computes
and then he sends it to A. (b) Simulation of VEIS oracle: when A submits a message m and an identity U and requests a VEIS, B first gets a private key of U as he does in Simulation of Signing Key Oracle, and he generates the signature as follows:
en, he encrypts the signature with PK T by
Finally, he sends ω � (ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 , ω 4 ) to A.
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(c) Simulation of adjudication oracle: when A submits a message m, a VEIS ω � (ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 , ω 4 ), and an identity U and requests a signature, B decrypts the VEIS as follows:
en, he sends the signature σ � (σ 0 , σ 1 , σ 2 ) to A. e simulation above is perfect since B does it honestly. Forge: finally, A submits a tuple (m * , ω * , U * ) to B, where the adversary has never queried Signing Key Oracle at U * , VEIS Oracle at (m * , U * ), or Adjudication Oracle at (m * , ω * , U * ). If VEVer(m * , ω * , MPK, PK T , U * ) � 1, then we have Ver(m * , σ * , MPK, U * ) � 1 (it implies the extractability of VEIS and we will prove this later), and B can decrypt the VEIS and obtain a valid signature as follows:
(28)
us, B forges a valid signature σ * � (σ * 0 , σ * 1 , σ * 2 ) with a nonnegligible probability ϵ. is completes the proof.
Lemma 2.
e modified signature scheme is existentially unforgeable.
The proof is almost the same as stated in [14] , and we use eorem 1 to show that.
Theorem 3.
Our VEIS scheme is opaque if the aggregate extraction assumption holds, and the underlying signature scheme is existentially unforgeable.
Proof. Suppose adversary A breaks the opacity of the VEIS scheme with nonnegligible probability ϵ, then we can construct an adversary B that solves the aggregate extraction problem. A and B play the game Game Opac (λ), and B simulates the challenger. e aggregate extraction problem: given g, g a , g b , g β , g δ , and g ab+βδ , compute g ab .
We now construct B as follows:
Setup. B chooses n u -length vectors U � (u i ), and n m -length vector M � (m j ) at random, where u i , m j ∈ G. Besides, pick random u ′ , m ′ ∈ G. en he sets g 1 � g a , g 2 � g b , and the master public key MPK � (G, G T , e, g, g 1 , g 2 , u ′ , U, m ′ , M), and public key PK T � g β . en he sends MPK and PK T to A, which are indistinguishable from the real ones. Although B does not know MSK � g a 2 and SK T � β, we can still complete the simulation by playing some tricks. B sets l u � 2(q 1 + q 2 ) and l m � 2q 2 (A can query at most q 1 times for private keys and q 2 times for VEISs). en, B chooses x ′ , z ′ , n u -length vector X � (x i ), and n m -length vector Z � (z j ) at random, where x ′ and x i are random values in 0, . . . , l u and z ′ and z j are random values in 0, . . . , l m . Besides, B picks y ′ , w ′ , n u -length vector Y � (y i ), and n m -length vector W � (w j ), where y ′ , y i , w ′ , and w j are random elements in Z p .
g w′ , and m j � g z j 2 g w j , where 0 ≤ k 1 ≤ n u and 0 ≤ k 2 ≤ n m . en, define the following functions for easy analysis:
Query. B simulates oracles as follows:
(a) Simulation of signing key oracle: when A submits an identity U of a signer and requests a private key, B constructs it as follows:
Writing r u � r u − (a/F 1 (U)), the private key can be simplified as 
where r m � r m − (a/F 2 (m ℓ )). en, he chooses random t and encrypts the signature with PK T as follows:
If ℓ � ℓ * , then B chooses random r u , r u ′ , r m and sets
Finally, he sends the VEIS ω ℓ � (ω 1,ℓ , ω 2,ℓ , ω 3,ℓ , ω 4,ℓ ) and ω ℓ * � (ω 1,ℓ * , ω 2,ℓ * , ω 3,ℓ * , ω 4,ℓ * ) to A and stores the tuple 
en, the probability that B has not aborted in the above game is as follows:
(36) e probability that B correctly guesses the index ℓ * is 1/q 2 , and we deduce Pr[S 1 ] ≥ 1/(16q 2 (q 1 + q 2 )(n u + 1)(n m + 1)) since we use proof skills in [16] . us, we have
And the probability that B solves the aggregate extraction problem is at least ε/(16q 2 2 (q 1 + q 2 )(n u + 1)(n m + 1)), which is nonnegligible. is completes the proof of opacity.
Simulation
In this section, we report several simulations and the results show that our VEIS scheme and optimistic fair exchange protocol are practical. We conducted experiments with Pairing Based Cryptography (PBC, http://crypto.stanford. edu/pbc/) library. e experiments were compiled in C programming language and carried out on Inter(R) Core(TM) Quad CPU Core i7-6700K @ 4.00 GHz. e security parameter was set to be 160, and the length of an element in group G, G T was 512 bits. e efficiency of our VEIS scheme mainly depends on the length of users' identities, which was chosen from 32 bits to 240 bits to evaluate the performance of our VEIS scheme and optimistic fair exchange protocol.
Before performing our experiments, we first compare several VES schemes by theoretical analysis. e results are shown in Table 3 .
Let E, H, and e denote exponent operation time, operation time of hash function, and pairing operation time, and all the other light-weight operations such as additions and multiplications are omitted. We can find the efficiency of our scheme is comparable with other efficient schemes. e VES schemes in [9, 11] are more efficient; however, Boneh's scheme is PKI-based and Gu's scheme is not quite secure. Although VES schemes in [14, 15] are more secure, too many hash operations still reduce the efficiency of the schemes. Our VEIS scheme overcomes their weaknesses and is still efficient. e simulation results are shown in the following papers.
In Figure 3 , we show the running time of our VEIS scheme with different length of identities (n u ). We do not consider the length of files (n m ) since we have the similar results when only changing n m . e length of identities is chosen from 32 bits to 240 bits; that is, n u � 32, 64, 80, 160, 240. And the full time ranges from 120 ms to 688 ms. e algorithm Setup takes roughly the same processing time, which is the biggest part of full operation time. To the contrary, SKG costs about 3 ms, and the rest algorithms costs about 16 ms for different length of identities. erefore, once the system is set up, it is very efficient for users to generate their VEISs in cloud. Since the private key generator must distribute all users' keys, we have to evaluate whether it is suitable for a large number of users who take activities in cloud-assisted CPSes. e length of identity is set to be 160 bits, and Figure 4 shows the results. For cloud data services which have 100000 users, our scheme only takes about 350 seconds to generate their signing keys.
In Figure 5 , we show the running time of optimistic fair exchange with different length of identities. In the experiments, we do not consider the communication time which is hard to evaluate due to some subjective factors. e full protocol takes less than 1 second when the length of the identity is set to be 240 bits, and it is quite acceptable. Initialization takes a little more time than other phases; however, we only need to perform it once in the system. When two users exchange their signatures of digital files in cloud, they only need to take 50 or 60 ms to finish the transaction.
e above results show that our protocol is efficient and practical in cloud-assisted CPSes.
Conclusion
Optimistic fair exchange in cloud-assisted CPSes is a kind of protocol in which two parties can exchange their signatures of digital content in cloud. In this paper, we constructed such a protocol with a new cryptographic technique, i.e., verifiably encrypted identity-based signature (VEIS), which is based on Paterson's IBS scheme and ElGamal encryption scheme. en, we showed that our protocol is secure with the strictest security proof. Additionally, we discussed fairness of our protocol, and the results showed that both two parties obtain each other's signature or neither of them get anything useful in the protocol. Finally, the results of the simulation showed that our protocol is practical.
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